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Abstract
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s Broadband Technology Opportunities Program
(BTOP) spent $4.7B during 2009-2013 to, int. al, increase broadband adoption in underserved
communities.

We characterize the BTOP grants and examine the impact of the awards on

broadband adoption. Econometric specifications controlling for award endogeneity related to
observed and unobserved county-level factors find that spending is apparently associated with
increased broadband adoption.

Further investigation, however, reveals that the impacts of

spending are nonlinear and even nonmonotonic over the range of county-level BTOP spending in
the data. Controlling for trends to reduce the potential for spurious correlation between spending
and outcomes removes most of the significance of the results. We conclude with three lessons
for policymakers derived from the uncertain outcomes of BTOP spending found in our
exploration.
*Corresponding author

I.

Introduction
In 2009, the United States federal government passed The American Recovery and

Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a stimulus act that comprised the immediate goals of creating and
saving jobs and spurring economic activity while claiming to provide accountability and
transparency in spending. Of the over $800 billion in stimulus funds, $7.2 billion was allocated
for expanding access to broadband services throughout the nation (NTIA, 2011). There is a great
deal of research showing that increases in broadband penetration are associated with increases in
GDP, which provides a link between the broadband program and the government’s ultimate
goals of the stimulus act. 1
Of the $7.2 billion allocated for broadband generally, Congress appropriated $4.7 billion
for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to administer the
Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). 2 The availability of BTOP funds was
intended to increase broadband access and adoption rates among populations underrepresented
with respect to broadband usage, such as minorities and low-income households, along with the
larger goals of creating jobs and spurring economic growth. 3 In this paper, we analyze one of the
BTOP program outcomes by asking: did BTOP spending result in increased broadband
adoption?
By September 30, 2010, two rounds of applications and funding for BTOP were
completed, and over $4 billion had been disbursed to 289 recipients proposing projects in four

1

Gillett et al., (2006) and Katz and Suter, (2009) identified positive links between broadband deployment and
economic prosperity. Scott (2012) similarly found that a 10% increase in broadband penetration is correlated with a
1.35% increase in GDP for developing countries, and a 1.19% increase for developed countries. See also
Koutroumpis (2009) and Qiang et al. (2009).
2
NTIA is an executive branch agency under the U.S. Department of Commerce that advises the executive branch of
the federal government on the telecommunications industry. The remaining $2.5 billion the ARRA allocated to
broadband was to be distributed through the Rural Utilities Service (RUS).
3
ASR (2012).
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categories: supporting communities’ efforts to sustain adoption of broadband service
(“sustainable adoption,” 44 grants; $251 million), the deployment of broadband infrastructure
(123 grants; $3,500 million), expanding public computer centers (66 grants; $201 million), and
maintaining a nationwide public map of broadband service capacity and availability (56 grants –
one per state, five U.S. territories, and Washington D.C.; $293 million) (NTIA 2014). 4
Applicants for BTOP funds were to describe fully their goals and implementation plans
and to satisfy at least one of the statutory purposes, 5 the most relevant of which for this
investigation are to provide access to broadband service in unserved and underserved areas and
to stimulate demand for broadband. 6 Funds awarded in the sustainable adoption category, to
which we pay special attention below, could be used to deploy broadband‐related technology,
digital literacy programs aimed at broadband usage, broadband-related education and outreach,
and programs to provide potential users with greater access to broadband. 7 Each BTOP
applicant was expected to specify which of the federal goals and target groups the project would
benefit. Using each funded project’s application summary and quarterly reports, we created a
dataset of all programs funded under both rounds of the program in 2009 and 2010. 8 Details of
the data are found in Section 3.

4

Prior to implementation of the BTOP program, the government broadly determined funding priorities by
specifying the total allocation of funds to be granted in each category.
5
See NARA (2009). For an excellent summary of the funding process see Rosston and Wallsten (2013).
Broadband USA also offers documentation explaining the rules and processes of the BTOP program:
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/. Finally, the following NTIA website offers answers to frequently asked questions about
BTOP: http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/files/nofa2_faqs_5_28_10.pdf.
6
From BroadbandUSA Connecting America’s Communities, accessed August 17, 2014, at
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/documents/BTOPPolicyReviewPPT.pdf. Unserved areas have less than 10% broadband
penetration, and underserved areas have less than 40% penetration. The other purposes of BTOP were to support
the missions of schools, libraries, healthcare providers and public safety agencies with broadband access, training,
and use.
7
Eligible Costs for Sustainable Broadband Adoption, 74 Fed. Reg.33113 (July 9, 2009).
8
Applications in Round 1 were accepted from July 14, 2009 to August 14, 2009. Round 2 applications were
accepted from February 16, 2010 to March 16, 2010, with the exception of an extension until March 26, 2010 for
awards in the category of comprehensive community infrastructure.
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To analyze outcomes, we employ econometric models that relate broadband adoption
before and after implementation to the amount of BTOP funding in the county. Given the
interval censored (i.e., ordinal categorical) nature of the observed dependent variable, fixed
broadband lines per household in a county, we develop a novel adaptation of an estimation
method for ordinal logit models with fixed effects. Our adaptation, unlike existing methods,
allows identification of the marginal effects in the scale of the latent continuous variable. Thus,
we are able to estimate the impact of BTOP spending on broadband penetration, even though the
latter is only indirectly observed in the data. Simple regression specifications find apparently
significant impacts of the BTOP awards on broadband adoption. However, estimations based
upon more stringent econometric specifications (i.e., a higher bar for evidence of causality by
accounting for trends) reveal that the marginal impacts of spending vary greatly at different
spending levels and are far less certain than the simple specifications indicate. In fact, the impact
of the stimulus spending on broadband adoption may well be zero, at least across most of the
range of spending.
Historically, relatively few analyses have measured actual program outcomes from
broadband and other Internet adoption programs (Hauge and Prieger, 2010); most evaluations
focus only on program implementation. For example, one might confirm that computers with
Internet access were installed at a school, but find no assessment of whether students’ access to
the Internet, grades, test scores, graduation rates, or future labor market outcomes improved as a
result. 9 Our work thus provides a valuable contribution to the literature on program effectiveness
in the area of digital diffusion programs. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we
provide a brief review of relevant literature. Section III explains the data. Section IV explains

9

See Goolsbee and Guryan (2006) for a rare exception.
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the empirical method and Section V provides results. Section 0 offers policy implications and
the conclusion.

II.

Literature
There are huge literatures—largely separate—on outcomes from government spending

and the determinants of broadband deployment and adoption. We constrain our review to those
works that seek to determine program outcomes, and highlight research that considers the direct
and indirect effects of spending or other factors driving broadband adoption. With broadband
infrastructure of some form now reaching nearly all the population, cost might be deemed the
next critical barrier to adoption. However, according to the FCC’s “Broadband Adoption and
Use in America” (Horrigan, 2010), only 36 percent of non-adopters cite cost as the main reason
they do not have broadband at home. This means the majority of non-adopters cite other factors
for not adopting. For example, 22 percent of non-adopters cited digital illiteracy as a factor and
19 percent cited lack of relevance. If it is important to increase digital literacy and the perceived
relevance of broadband and the Internet, then a multi-faceted approach to increasing broadband
adoption is appropriate. In prior work (Hauge and Prieger, 2010), we reviewed both supply-side
(infrastructure) and demand-side (adoption and use) programs and the few available subsequent
analyses of such programs. We noted that “Encouraging broadband adoption is only part of a
larger digital literacy effort, and programs work when they make non-users want to connect,
make the Internet cheaper and easier to use, and adjust to users’ preferences” [page 1]. TurnerLee and Gant (2010) affirm our assertion and suggest that policy should focus on the perceptions
and behaviors of broadband consumers to encourage increased adoption and usage. Their paper
offers a survey of the existing evidence regarding the acceptance of broadband given
affordability, availability, and accessibility. Turner-Lee and Gant cite the expected performance
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of broadband and the time, energy, and social aspects of adoption as driving forces behind such
adoption. They do not, however, examine the impact of public computing centers or sustainable
adoption programs on adoption.
Some research focuses on communities which lag in broadband adoption and examine
barriers to use. Gant et al. (2010) use data from the National Minority Broadband Adoption
Study conducted in 2009 and 2010, and present evidence on white, black, and Hispanic
broadband adoption and usage, concluding that the value of adoption is not seen equally across
races and ethnicities. Similarly, Horrigan and Satterwhite (2010) suggest that broadband
adoption requires three “pillars”: infrastructure, sustained innovation (that results in lower costs
and improvements in usability), and a network of social support for potential users. Horrigan
and Satterwhite focus on the last of these pillars, and argue that policymakers must understand
that the social infrastructure around non-adopters is crucial to drawing them to sustained and
meaningful Internet use. The primary method for such encouragement is providing support at a
local level that focuses on education of non-adopters so that they become comfortable with
technological innovations, and so that a culture of use is promoted. Similarly, Prieger
(forthcoming) notes that the differences in usage rates (generally) are statistically significant and
reveal large adoption gaps by race and ethnicity that do not appear to be caused by lack of access
to broadband. Interestingly, the racial gaps for blacks do not persist when considering mobile
broadband.
Finally, Peronard and Flemming (2011) cite the lack of relevant content as reason for
non-adoption, and suggests that encouraging more appropriate content may be optimal for
increasing adoption. 10 He points out that there is a need for “an enriched theoretical approach
aimed at empirically examining the relationship between broadband adoption and the
10

See also: Firth and Mellor, 2005; Papacharissi and Zaks, 2006; Preston, Cawley, and Metykova, 2007.
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interpretation of causes and effects” (page 692). These papers present the state of affairs, and
together suggest that the inclusion of public computing center grants and sustainable adoption
grants are likely to be effective if they target non-adopting communities, but the research fails to
link such programs to increased adoption.
In addition to more general research on broadband adoption, some recent research
specifically addresses BTOP as part of the ARRA. Many such papers report negative findings.
Gimpel et al. (2013) state that the geographic distribution of funds was poorly mismatched with
needs, therefore resulting in the lack of success of the program. Rosston and Wallsten (2013)
echo this conclusion calling the program’s allocation of funds inefficient, and later in Wallsten
and Rosston (2013) calling the program a “rural boondoggle”. Given their early date, none of
these works considered the intended outcomes of the various programs; rather, they analyzed the
distribution of funds and its efficiency and apparent equity. In another paper, Jackson and
Gordon (2011) studied 27 projects that engaged in BTOP and the Broadband Initiatives Program.
They found examples of difficulties and also of successes and from these projects offer lessons
for future publicly funded programs.
Jayakar and Park (2012) offer a thorough study of factors likely to lead to the success of
Public Computer Center (PCC) grants. They note that the BTOP required PCC projects to
specify the degree of accessibility of the planned PCC to the public and to verify the technical
feasibility of the project. The authors suggest that the demand characteristics of the community
would allow better prediction of the anticipated success of PCCs, and therefore allow for more
efficient distribution of funds, but that the BTOP grant process did not incorporate these
considerations. In contrast to their earlier, prospective work, the same authors subsequently
(Park and Jayakar, 2013), analyze empirically the distribution of BTOP PCC funds and find that

6

money went to areas of pre-existing high broadband availability and demand, contrary to the
BTOP’s goals. Nevertheless, they conclude that this pattern of funding is cost-efficient.
Perhaps closest to our work in this respect is that by LaRose et al. (2014), who provide an
excellent overview of the BTOP applicants and funds distributed, and emphasize that the main
empirical studies in the U.S. are correlational and as such, offer limited evidence of the causal
impacts of broadband investment, and even less the effects of public investment. While they
utilize a database similar to that which we have amassed, they did not include an empirical
evaluation as BTOP projects were not scheduled to be completed until the end of 2012 (with
possible extensions through the end of 2013). This small subset of projects, however, does little
to inform the overall analysis is BTOP program outcomes.
While we have not found prior research indicating that public computer centers or
sustainable adoption programs have increased broadband adoption, we do find that certain
factors have proven to be successful in increasing adoption. For example, Prieger (forthcoming)
shows that mobile broadband may be successful in connecting minority communities to the
Internet where they live. In a 2006 paper, Glass (2006) found that adoption rates for Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) services in rural areas increase significantly once video is added to the
service bundle. Subsequently, Glass and Stefanova (2010) show that policies that lower the cost
of providing video may stimulate broadband adoption. Other important drivers of adoption are
content on the Internet (Howell, 2002), specifically home entertainment in general (Choudrie and
Dwivedi, 2006) and applications such as downloading music and online purchasing (Kolko,
2010) in specific.
The Office of Management and Budget states that an appropriate evaluation of a federal
project such as BTOP should assess whether implementing the program resulted in its intended

7

results for its intended beneficiaries (OMB, 2009). Clearly it is easier to determine progress
towards project execution than to determine the effects of implemented projects. Regardless,
projects should be designed to have real impacts on participants, and potential impacts should be
verified empirically using convincing econometric methods to establish causal relationships.
Therefore, in this paper we focus on the effects on broadband adoption of projects funded by
BTOP. The success of specific demand-side programs designed to encourage broadband
adoption remains largely unproven in the literature (Hauge and Prieger, 2010). For this reason,
our attempt to discern the outcome of BTOP program funding represents an important
contribution to the literature.

III.

Research questions and associated data
To determine program outcomes, we started by categorizing projects by the claimed

outcomes in the applications. We included all applicants classified by project category; type of
applicant (e.g., a city, private company, or university); the location of both the applicant and the
proposed project’s targeted recipient(s); characteristics of each project’s targeted group(s) (e.g.,
Native American, disabled, or veteran); and the stated goal(s) of the project (e.g. , digital
literacy, healthcare, or workforce development). 11 We added the associated county-level sociodemographic data for each project’s target area for analysis in this section.
A BTOP grant may cover a single county, several counties, an entire state, areas of
multiple states, or (in a few cases) the whole nation. The econometric results in Section IV are
based on the geography claimed as the intended recipient of the benefit of the grant. For the key
“treatment” variable for the estimations, we construct a county-level BTOP spending variable as

11

Rosston and Wallsten attempted to obtain data directly from the NTIA but were given an estimated initial fee of
$144,715.09 to process their data request; they concluded that “the NTIA does not make such information readily
available.” (Rosston and Wallsten, 2013, footnote 10).
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follows. First, the set of counties claimed to be benefited by each award was determined. This
step necessarily involved judgment in some cases, because the NTIA did not require applicants
to be specific. 12 Second, out of necessity the total award amount was split among associated
counties proportionally to the numbers of households they contained. While this assumption of
uniform spending across the area of intended benefit is surely wrong, there are no consistent data
in the applications to allow more refined allocations. Thus, there is inescapably some
measurement error in the key treatment variable, and we explore this in our robustness tests
below. Third, the spending per household was aggregated across all funded projects to arrive at
the total BTOP award amount per household for each county in the nation. Funding in aggregate
for the county ranges from $0.71 per household (those counties only covered by the three
nationwide projects) to $5,049 per household. Average spending is $55 and median spending is
$22. The distribution of the log of this variable is shown in Figure 1. 13
Table 1 provides details on the type of applicants across BTOP categories. Private entities
(listed as “Others” in the table), including both non-profit and for-profit organizations compose
the majority (52.8 percent) of applicants, receiving just under half of all funds disbursed (48.4
percent). States, tribal applicants, and universities were better able to secure funding than each of
the other applicant types: their percentage point difference in total applications funded less total
applications were 14.7, 0.5, and 0.01, respectively. Cities (-8.2 percentage point difference
between applications and funded projects), Other (-4.3), and Libraries (-2.1) were least
successful. While this result indicates tribal lands were recognized as a target group as specified

12

Examples of judgment include matching statements such as “rural New Mexico” to noncore RUPRI counties and
“south central rural North Dakota” to non-CBSA counties in the south central part of the state.
13
Logging the variable reduces greatly the skewness in the spending levels, but the inherent bimodality remains.
While bimodality does not, in principle, render the spending variable unsuitable for use as a regressor, it does lead
us to consider carefully in the econometrics whether the variable’s impact on outcomes of interest changes as
spending increases.
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by BTOP goals, it also suggests local applicants were less successful than might be ideal given
the BTOP’s emphasis on local community driven programs. 14
In Table 2, we differentiate between applications designed to provide programs within a
single county and those covering multiple counties, including state-wide, multi-state, and
national programs. We find that multi-county programs (i.e. those of larger geographic scope)
were more successful at securing funding than programs designed to serve a single county. This
seems counter to BTOP’s emphasis on the importance of community support and community
anchor institutions, and runs counter to the notion that local level programs are likely to have
greater demand-side impact on unserved and underserved communities than non-local programs.
Next, we quantified the frequency with which stated program targets were cited in
applications. To do this, we recorded any statement in an application referencing aid to the
various groups BTOP was designed to help. The frequencies of citations of these BTOP target
groups are shown in Table 3. We note the importance of digital literacy and workforce
development as demand-side programs, and the importance of mapping for entities to determine
infrastructure needs. Similar analysis for the category of the proposal is in Table 4. Note that
while Infrastructure proposals were not the majority category by number of proposals, such
proposals were most often funded and received the most money. Public Computer Center and
Sustainable Adoption proposals were funded at a lower rate. Since Sustainable Adoption
projects were aimed specifically at increasing broadband adoption, we examine this category by
itself in the empirical work below. The distribution of spending in the Sustainable Adoption
category is shown in Figure 2. About 45% of counties received no specific BTOP funding in this

14

In the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program Frequently Asked Questions (May 28, 2010, page 10), it is
stated that “Proposals that would benefit tribal entities receive extra consideration by the program during review,
and the comments of tribes are a selection factor in choosing BTOP awards.”
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category apart from the single nationwide award (which contributed $0.13 per household to each
county). Another 22% of counties each received $0.58 per household, the sum of the nationwide
and a single large multistate grant. The average Sustainable Adoption funding per household is
$1.82, the median is $0.58, and the maximum is $240.
Did groups most in need, termed “unrepresented and underrepresented” in the BTOP
guidelines, apply for and receive funding commensurate with those needs? We cannot determine
why some (statistically) needy communities did not apply for funding, but we can compare the
size of BTOP target subpopulations in counties with applications and counties covered by no
application. Since technically all counties are covered by statewide and(the few nationwide
projects, only applications targeting specific counties are included in these statistics. The left
side of Table 5 summarizes these data using the proportion of the county population composed
by various socio-demographic characteristics. The proportions are first calculated with simple
and population-weighted averages. The table shows, for example, that in counties specifically
covered by at least one BTOP application, blacks compose an average of 10.2% of the
population (see column one), while in other counties blacks make up 4.4% of the population
(column three). The population weighted figures, 13.6% vs. 7.2%, show that subpopulation from
counties appearing in applications has a higher proportion of blacks than does the subpopulation
from counties not covered by an specific application. For a different comparison, column two of
Table 5 reports an application-weighted version of the figures, so that a county covered by n
applications receives n times as much weight in the averages. The application-weighted
proportion of blacks in applicant counties is even higher than the previous figures from column
one, implying that not only were minority-heavy counties targeted by applications, they also
received coverage under more applications. The same is true, to different degrees, for Hispanics
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and Asians, but not for Native Americans, the disabled, veterans, or senior citizens. This
suggests that some of the populations most in need (but not all) were more likely to apply for
funding, in accordance with BTOP goals.
The last two columns of Table 5 show, for the subset of counties covered by an
application, a comparison of demographics when applications were funded versus denied. When
there are material differences in the demographics between these groups of counties, as there are
for blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and possibly American Indians, they are in the direction of
favoring applications covering more minorities. Because these minorities (apart from Asians) are
typically underrepresented among broadband users, 15 these results suggest that funding,
generally speaking, was allocated according to BTOP goals of serving those populations most
underrepresented in terms of broadband.
How should we expect BTOP spending to stimulate broadband adoption? At one end of
the black box, money is spent on programs with various BTOP goals. At the other end is the
potential for increased broadband adoption (as well as the other BTOP targets not examined
here). There are many mechanisms, direct and indirect, by which spending on broadband
programs may lead to adoption. Sustainable adoption projects, by definition and goal, should
have a direct impact on adoption. Infrastructure projects have indirect effects on demand
through the supply side, to the extent that new areas gain access to broadband (or to higher
quality or lower price broadband). Finally, spending on any type of project may have indirect
effects on broadband adoption through many channels: demand-side externalities through

15

In July 2011, 71% of non-Hispanic whites and 72% of Asians used the Internet at home, but only 52% of blacks
and 49% of Hispanics did. Another way to examine broadband availability for minorities is to compare the number
of residential broadband providers available to a representative member of each racial or ethnic group. Sixty-four%
of white non-Hispanics have the greatest chance of having four or more fixed broadband providers where they live.
Blacks have the lowest similar probability, at 46%, followed by Asians and Pacific Islanders (49%) and Hispanics
(53%) (all statistics from Prieger (forthcoming)).
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network effects, demand stimulation from being introduced to broadband through a public
computer center or digital literacy project, market externalities stemming from increased
competition or lowered prices prompted by BTOP activity, or other supply-side externalities
(e.g., high participation in a BTOP sustainable adoption project may prompt existing broadband
providers to market more attentively and attractively to the target population). We do not seek to
disentangle these mechanisms, but instead look for whether the total effect through all channels
is large enough to be measureable. Given the special connection between sustainable adoption
projects and broadband adoption, however, we do examine sustainable adoption spending by
itself in some estimations.
The specific outcome we consider is fixed residential broadband connections per 100
households (RFC/HH). “Broadband” is defined two ways: by the FCC definition of at least 200
kbps in at least one direction; or, by the BTOP definition of at least 768 kbps downstream and
greater than 200 kbps upstream. The latent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is not observed; instead, categorical

variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0,1,…,5 is observed. The categories are defined as in Table 6. Summary statistics
of these outcomes and the BTOP spending variables are shown in Table 7.

IV.

Empirical methods
The years of data included in the estimations are 2009, before the programs were funded,

and 2013, after funding and implementation. Let Git be the BTOP log award size per household
in county i and year t, where award dollars have been aggregated to the county level as described
in the previous section. Treatment variable Git will be defined variously as total spending,
spending allocated to Sustainable Adoption grants, and spending allocated to awards in
categories other than Sustainable Adoption. Let 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ be the outcome of interest, RFC/HH,

measured midyear for 2009. For 2013, the FCC version of RFC/HH is measured at year end,
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while the BTOP version is measured at the beginning of the year (the latest available). 16 For Git,
it is assumed (in accord with program start dates) that no money is spent as of Q1 2009 and all
money is spent as of the end of 2013, although some projects from round two of the funding had
not finished as of that date. 17 Additionally, because some broadband and economic data for 2014
is not yet available, 2013 makes a natural ending date for us in any event. So Git = 0 for 2009
and Git for 2013 is the full amount awarded. We present several models for assessing the
association between local BTOP spending and outcomes, proceeding from simple to more
complex specifications.
Each specification for the latent variable is of the general linear form

or

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

where xi is a vector of variables (including a constant) for the economic and demographic
characteristics of the county at the start of our study period, 2009; 18 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a county-specific term

incorporating all time-invariant observed and unobserved heterogeneity; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a mean-zero

error term following the logistic distribution with scale parameter σ, possibly correlated across t
within the same county. The term 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 subsumes factors related to the endogeneity of G due to

selection bias in the awarding of BTOP money. Furthermore, note that the county-specific

intercept also includes factors such as the economic growth or change in broadband usage in the
county, expected as of 2009, which also may be related to the distribution of the BTOP awards.
16

The RFC/HH data using the BTOP definition are unavailable after December 31, 2012 due to a change in data
collection at the FCC.
17
By December 2013, 192 projects (86% of all) had been completed (according to NTIA’s 20th Quarterly Status
Report, issued June 26, 2014). The remaining 32 projects in progress had received an unspecified extended award
period.
18
Given our short period under study, how slowly demographics typically evolve, and our inclusion of county fixed
effects in the estimations, we will not worry about year-specific demographic covariates.
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Terms 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and β are not separately identifiable, which is why only one of these will appear in any
particular regression. We also allow for nonlinearity in the impact of BTOP spending on RFC
and control for national trends by examining the following additional specification,
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3)

where f is a nonlinear function of G and τ is a year fixed effect. We estimate f with a flexible
curve-fitting method, restricted cubic splines. 19 The addition of the trend to the specification
implies that identification of the impact of spending comes from increases in spending and
broadband adoption that are net of national trends. Controlling for trends may be important in
this application because both G and y trend upward.
Since latent variable 𝑦𝑦 ∗ is unobserved, we estimate the unknown parameters of the model

by maximum likelihood (MLE). The relationship between the latent and observed variables is

shown in Figure 3. 20 In equation (1), the parameters (𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) are identifiable with MLE. 21 We

use the Baetschmann (2012) extension to Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann’s (2011) “blow
up and cluster” (BUC) method for fixed effects ordered logit to account for the fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 in
equations (2) and (3). In the BUC method, the dependent variable is converted to a set of

dichotomous dependent variables, and conditional logit regression is then used to estimate the
slope coefficients. Baetschmann (2012) showed how BUC can be extended to identify the
ordered logit cutpoints in addition. Finally, in the appendix we show how these methods,

19

Restricted cubic splines (Harrell, 2001) result in an estimated continuous and differentiable f that is linear before
the first knot and after the last knot, and is a piecewise cubic polynomial between adjacent knots.
20
The figure reveals that we have made a slight simplification in identifying y* with RFC/HH. Latent y* takes
values on the real line, while actual RFC/HH cannot be negative (although it could, in principle, exceed 100). A
more pedantic exposition would define the latent variable y** to take values on the real line, then define y* =
RFC/HH to be a left censored version of y* a la the Tobit model, and then finally to define y as the categorical
observed variable. For our purposes, the only thing that matters, however, is that y* as we have defined it has units
on the appropriate scale of RFC/HH.
21
We estimate the model using constrained ordered logit estimation, as described in the appendix. In ordered
logistic regression, the scale parameter σ is not identified separately from the coefficients and the cutpoints, but here
σ and the constant in β are identified because the cutpoints are known (see Figure 3).
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combined with our knowledge of the location of the actual cutpoints, can be used to identify the
scale of the logistic error term. With the variance of the logistic error term estimated, we can
then estimate the marginal effects in the natural scale of RFC/HH. In particular, the marginal
effects will correspond to changes in residential broadband lines per hundred households. To
account for correlation over time among the error terms from the same county, we estimate all
standard errors using a cluster-robust estimator.

V.

Results
This section contains the estimation results and the implied marginal effects of the BTOP

spending. Using data on all funded projects, we begin with a simple linear specification, add
county fixed effects to control for selection bias, demonstrate the need to allow for nonlinear
impacts of spending, and finally estimate the model accounting for time trends.
A.

Linear Specifications

The results for the regression specification based on equation (1) are in Table 8. Each
column in the table is for a regression with the dependent variable RFC/HH defined with the
definition of broadband as given in the column heading. The first pair of columns is for the
impact of total BTOP spending, while the last two columns are for sustainable adoption spending
only. Given the log form of the spending variable Gi, the coefficient on spending, γ, is 100 times
the marginal effect on RFC/HH (on a 100 point scale) of a 1% increase in the BTOP award per
household in the county. Thus the estimated coefficient of spending of 2.6 in column one of
Table 8, for the FCC definition of broadband, implies that a 1% increase in total BTOP spending
is associated with increased broadband adoption of 0.026 (i.e., an additional 0.026 connections
per 100 households). The marginal effects using the BTOP definition of broadband RFC/HH is a
bit larger (2.92) and is also statistically significant. In general, across all our regressions the
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marginal effects are typically (but not always) slightly larger for the BTOP version of the
dependent variable but—importantly—do not have higher significance levels (compared to the
FCC version of y). With that in mind, and given that the FCC-defined data are available for
longer than are the BTOP-defined data, we will not discuss explicitly the results for the BTOP
definition of RFC/HH below.
While the covariates added to the regressions are included only to control for omitted
variable bias in the impacts of BTOP spending, it is interesting to note that many of their
coefficients are significant, and in the direction typically found in other studies of broadband
penetration, diffusion, and adoption (e.g., Chaudhuri, et al., 2005; Prieger and Hu, 2008).
Counties with more people and business establishments, counties with a lower proportion of nonAsian minorities, and higher proportions of Asian minorities, more educated residents, and
higher-income households generally have higher predicted RFC/HH (although the impact of
income and education are not monotone). The only unexpected result is that counties with more
senior citizens have higher broadband penetration. 22
The coefficients on spending from BTOP awards that target sustainable adoption, in
columns three and four of Table 8, are higher than those for total spending. This is as expected,
since not all BTOP spending is aimed specifically at increasing home adoption of broadband.
The estimates of the impact of spending from equation (1) may be biased if awards were
granted to counties based on their prospects for growth in broadband adoption. We may
naturally expect that selection bias would attenuate the estimated impact of spending (or even
reverse it) if more money was awarded to counties with dimmer prospects for increased adoption
in the absence of the awards. However, other work suggests that money was steered toward
22

In July 2011, 69.9% of those between the ages of 18 and 64 used broadband Internet at home, while only 39.7%
of senior citizens used broadband (computations by the authors using the Computer and Internet Use Supplement to
the Current Population Survey).
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counties with influential representatives in Congress (Hauge, 2015) and relatively favorable
conditions for broadband adoption (Park and Jayakar, 2013). Thus, in principle, the bias may be
in either direction. Adding county fixed effects, as in equation (2), and estimating via the BUC
method removes selection bias from the estimate of γ.
The results from estimations based on equation (2) are in the first six columns of Table 9.
Again we examine total (columns 1 and 2) and sustainable adoption spending (columns 3 and 4)
in separate regressions, and also split total spending into sustainable adoption and other spending
in the final pair of regressions (columns 5 and 6). Compared to the estimates in Table 8, adding
the fixed effects increases the coefficients on total and sustainable adoption spending in the first
four columns of Table 9. The increase is largest for the sustainable adoption coefficient, which
increases from 3.7 to 4.9 (for the FCC definition of the dependent variable). Thus selection bias
appears to have attenuated the marginal effects in the previous regressions. Even so, the
marginal effects are not large; a 10% increase in total spending would move the needle for
RFC/HH less than a third of a broadband connection. The coefficients fall when both sustainable
adoption and other spending are included in the same regression (columns 5 and 6 of Table 9),
but all are still significant.
In summary, the results from this section show that the BTOP spending is apparently
statistically significantly associated with broadband adoption, assuming that a linear-log
regression specification is correct. However, these results are not definitive—and we make no
claim regarding causality—because there may be additional nonlinearity in the marginal effect of
BTOP spending, and some of the positive association between G and y may come from spurious
correlation between trending variables. We investigate these issues in the following sections.
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B.

Nonlinearity in the effect of BTOP spending

Turn now to equation (3), where spending variable G enters the specification for the
mean outcome in a nonlinear fashion. We at first set aside the time trends, taking τ to be zero in
equation (3). The results of the interval censored logistic estimation via the BUC method, where
nonlinear function f(G) is estimated with restricted cubic splines, are in the first two columns
each of Table 10 and Table 11. The general significance of the spline variables 2 through 6,
which allow for the nonlinearity in f, provides evidence that constraining the impact of G to be
linear is incorrect.
The slope of f is the marginal impact of log spending. The nonlinearity and
nonmonotonicity between spending and adoption outcomes is clearly seen in Figure 4 (for total
spending) and Figure 5 (for sustainable adoption spending). If a linear specification as in
regression specifications (1) and (2) were correct, the plotted lines would be horizontal. The
estimated marginal effects lead to several conclusions. First, the confidence bands for the
marginal effects do not span zero in most places, indicating apparent statistically significant
association between spending and RFC/HH remains at most spending levels. Second, the
marginal effect is not always positive. At medium and the highest levels of total spending, there
is significant negative association between spending and adoption. The same is true for medium
levels of sustainable adoption spending. Third, the marginal effect is not monotone; there is
substantial nonmonotonicity in f.
C.

Accounting for time trends

We now turn to the full regression specification based on equation (3) including the trend term.
Inclusion of the trend along with the fixed effects implies that identification of γ comes from
variation in the increase in adoption and spending that is net of the average increases.
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This specification removes omitted variable bias potentially caused by spurious correlation
between the trending dependent variable and BTOP spending. The former has a positive trend
since broadband adoption, however measured, has steadily increased since the FCC first began to
measure it in 1999. The latter has a positive trend because BTOP spending is zero in every
county in 2009 and positive everywhere in 2013 (since there were a few nationwide projects that
contributed at least a little spending to each county). This specification sets the highest bar for
convincing evidence that BTOP spending causally affected adoption. The disadvantage of this
specification is that controlling for trends necessarily removes some of the variation in the data,
not all of which necessarily contributes to spurious correlation between spending and adoption.
Thus, while this specification yields regression results that are least likely to be afflicted with
spurious correlation, they are not necessarily the “best” estimates.
The estimation results for the flexible, nonlinear parameterization of the spending
impacts are in the last two columns each of Table 10 and Table 11, and the marginal effects are
plotted in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Comparing the marginal effects of total spending with and
without the trend in Figure 4 and Figure 6, it is apparent that the greatest difference is the wider
confidence band when the trend is included. For the FCC definition of broadband, spending has
a positive, significant impact on broadband adoption only for low levels of spending (up to about
1 log dollar) and in a middle range (roughly between 2 and 3 log dollars). Elsewhere the
marginal effects are insignificant or (in a narrow range from roughly 3.4 to 4 log dollars)
significantly negative. For the BTOP definition of broadband, spending has a positive,
significant impact on broadband adoption only for a middle range, roughly between 2 and 3 log
dollars. The impact of spending beyond that level turns negative. For sustainable adoption
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spending, the marginal effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero for all levels of
spending, for both definitions of broadband.
The conclusion that controlling for trends removes most or all of the apparent positive
association between BTOP spending and broadband adoption does not depend on the
nonlinearity in G allowed by equation (3). Adding a trend to any of the previous linear
specifications based on equation (2) results in either lack of significance of the spending
coefficient or, in the case of the FCC definition of broadband regressed on total spending, a
significant negative coefficient. As an example, the estimates for sustainable adoption spending
with trend are in the last two columns of Table 9.
D.

Robustness Checks

To bolster the strength of the findings above, we report the results of several additional
estimations in this section. For the first test of the robustness of the results, the spending variable
G is changed to be BTOP awarded amounts per capita, instead of per household. The estimated
spending coefficient γ with the new definition of G is very similar to the results above in each
Table (almost always to the first or second decimal place). The nonlinear marginal effects are
also virtually identical to those in Figure 4 through Figure 7. For the second robustness check,
the estimations are weighted by the number of households in the county. The size of the
coefficients rises (results not reported), but the significance levels and therefore our conclusions
do not change. For the third robustness check, we dropped observations for Alaska, Hawaii, and
Washington, D.C., the former two because they may have unique challenges for broadband
diffusion and the latter because its governance structure differs from a state. Again, the changes
in coefficients, marginal effects, and significance levels were trivial.
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In a fourth set of regressions, the regression in the final two columns of Table 9 is
estimated with spending in the Infrastructure category replacing spending in categories other
than Sustainable Adoption (see Table 12). Since most spending is in the Infrastructure category,
the difference between the two definitions is not great. Nevertheless, the size of the coefficients
on Sustainable Adoption spending changed markedly, both in regressions with and without the
residual “other spending” category. From these results we draw two conclusions. The apparent
statistical significance of Sustainable Adoption spending does not depend on how total spending
is categorized (although the magnitude of the apparent impact changes). Furthermore, the
instability of the spending coefficients with regard to the set of spending variables included
provides further evidence for the results being driven by spurious correlation among trending
variables. This provides further support for the inclusion of controls for trends in the regressions.
Another way to categorize BTOP awardees is by whether the recipient was a government
entity. In the fifth robustness test, we split total spending into amounts awarded to state, local,
and county governments and other recipients. The latter category includes private entities,
libraries, universities, and the few tribal awards granted. Since there is much evidence that
management by government leads to less efficient outcomes than when markets discipline the
managers, a dollar spent by a government may accomplish less of BTOP’s goals than a dollar
spent by other entities. 23 On the other hand, most (roughly two-thirds) of the awardees from the
private sector were nonprofits, which also may be largely shielded from market discipline,
particularly when spending money that is granted to them. 24 Thus we have no clear a priori
expectation of whether there will be a difference in the impact of spending by government versus
23

Ros (1999) finds that publicly owned telecommunications firms had lower labor productivity than privately
owned firms. For other industries, Megginson and Netter’s (2001, p.380) survey article concludes that the body of
research “supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient” than state owned firms.
24
There are likely to be deficient incentives for managers of nonprofits, since managers cannot legally share in the
surplus their decisions may create (see Weisbrod (1988) and citations therein).

22

other entities. In linear specifications, whether year fixed effects are included or not, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the spending by the two groups are the same.
For the sixth alternative approach, we remove from the sample any award that required
judgment in assigned spending to counties. As explained in Section III, many grant applications
were vague concerning the affected geography. This removes 535 county/award observations
out of the total of 19,383. 25 The regressions with the linear specifications yield similar results to
the main estimations. However, the nonlinear specifications return marginal effects that are
statistically insignificant over even larger ranges of spending. Figure 8 shows the marginal
effects for total spending from this sample. For almost all spending above de minimis levels, the
marginal effect is insignificant. When trends are controlled for, in Figure 9, the marginal effects
are insignificant everywhere except in a small region in which they are negative. Thus the
conclusions from the main set of estimations are strengthened.
In a seventh set of robustness tests, a difference in differences (D-D) approach is adopted
as an alternative method to control for trends. Since the treatment in the present context, G, is
not binary, we split the counties into binary spending groups various ways. First, counties are
assigned a treatment variable T1 = 1 if the county was granted sustainable adoption money from
at least one award apart from the single nationwide Sustainable Adoption grant. Out of the 3,137
counties in the sample, 1,711 are “treated” by this definition. Second, T2 = 1 if T1 = 1 and the
county received at least $0.58 per household. This threshold is the amount of spending from the
22-state project that results in the rightmost probability spike in the distribution of Sustainable
Adoption spending shown in Figure 2. In this regression, counties with intermediate spending
levels are removed from the sample to differentiate more starkly the treated and untreated
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These are the observations created by prorating each project to its affected counties, before spending is summed
over awards for each county.
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groups. With this definition, 1,631 of the 3,057 counties remaining in the sample are treated.
Finally, T3 = 1 if T1 = 1 and the county received more than $0.58 per household. This definition
is similar to the previous, except that counties covered only by the 22-state project are excluded
from the sample, yielding the most differentiation between treated and control counties among
these three D-D regressions. The results are in Table 13, which shows that none of the D-D
coefficients are close to statistical significance, particularly for the BTOP definition of
broadband. Indeed, two of the six estimated D-D coefficients are negative. Thus, we again
conclude that controlling for trends removes the statistical significance of BTOP spending on
broadband adoption. Furthermore, the D-D specification shows that this conclusion does not
depend on the nonlinearity allowed in equation (3).

VI.

Implications and conclusion
The empirical results lead to several implications for investigators attempting to evaluate

BTOP and for policymakers. First, the impact of the stimulus spending on broadband adoption
is highly uncertain. We did not find clear evidence supporting the position that BTOP led to
beneficial outcomes of increased adoption. We addressed endogeneity with fixed-effects
modeling and spurious correlation by controlling for trends. However, in the end many of our
results fall into the gray area between finding significant impacts of spending, at least in some
ranges, when not accounting for trends and complete or greatly reduced lack of significance
when accounting for trends. With such a high degree of uncertainty in the results, no sweeping
claims can be made for the success of BTOP as regards the goal of sustainable adoption. In fact,
in at least some ranges of spending, additional BTOP spending appears to lead to lower levels of
adoption.
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How do the implied costs per residential fixed connection from our estimates compare
with the figures from the NTIA’s evaluation of BTOP? The only residential broadband
subscription analysis in the NTIA’s report is for the Sustainable Adoption grants, where the
average cost across all awards is $476 per household subscriber. 26 The marginal costs per RFC
from Sustainable Adoption spending derived from our estimations are reported in Table 9, and
range from $40 to $116 from the estimations without controlling for trends. Since NTIA’s
estimate is based on a simple count of households served by grantee projects, without controlling
for trends in adoption or any other counterfactual, these estimates based on equation (2) are the
most comparable to the NTIA figure. It is natural that our figures are lower than NTIA’s average
cost per subscriber. Our estimates are marginal costs, and if there are some fixed costs in the
BTOP projects marginal cost is likely lower than average cost. However, our work above shows
that it is important to control for trends in the analysis. Controlling for trends, the point
estimation for marginal cost per RFC balloons to $667 for the FCC definition of broadband and
$8,611 for the BTOP definition (see the last two columns of Table 9). Furthermore, given that
the coefficients on Sustainable Adoption spending are insignificant in this latter regression,
arbitrarily large marginal costs per subscriber cannot be ruled out on grounds of statistical
insignificance. 27 Thus the true costs of connecting households via BTOP may be greatly higher
than NTIA’s estimate.
Furthermore, it appears that the marginal impacts of the BTOP spending, at least in the
aggregate, are neither linear nor even necessarily monotonic. Thus, a second lesson for
policymakers is to be suspicious of any policy evaluation of BTOP or other broadband-centric
stimulus or digital inclusion initiative that assumes spending (or log spending) has constant
26

The figure is apparently derived from the new subscribers each grantee claimed in its progress reports to NTIA.
Put in the inverse way, the 95% confidence interval for the number of households connected with an extra dollar
of sustainable adoption spending, which is [-0.0027,0.0029] for the estimation with trend, spans zero.
27

25

returns. The parallel lesson for empirical investigators is to avoid overly constraining the
econometric specifications to yield (the perhaps “desired”) positive results. If the only
estimations we performed were those in Table 8 and Table 9, we would have missed important
features of the data and been falsely optimistic about both the precision of the estimates and the
direction of the impact of spending on broadband adoption. The work here demonstrates that the
marginal effects on two measures of broadband adoption can be quite different at different
spending levels.
A third lesson for policymakers concerns the design of programs. While it would have
been possible to require awardees to submit projects that allowed for convincing evaluation of
outcomes (e.g., randomized selection of participants, constructing and monitoring control
groups, etc.), the NTIA did not do so. Ignoring best practice in policy design and evaluation in
this way violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the ARRA’s intent to provide accountability in
spending. 28 A full understanding of accountability requires assessing what society gained from
the expenditure of public funds. As the results above demonstrate, trying to recover the causal
impacts of the spending on broadband and labor market outcomes proved difficult, due to the
facts that every part of the country received at least some spending (at least in theory), there was
no true control group, and the impacts appear to be impossible to distinguish from state-specific
trends.
The results suggest that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the outcomes of the
specific programs. A fruitful avenue for further investigation would be to evaluate individual
28

The BTOP program took the narrowest approach to accountability, seeking to ensure only that money was spent
as intended. Grant recipients’ quarterly progress reports were made public in July 2014 (available at
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/awards) and show little detail with respect to project implementation other than funds
spent. Recipients were not held accountable for successful project outcomes. For overall project evaluation NTIA
paid ASR Analytics $5 million to study project success. As cited by Wallsten (2015), “ASR Analytics itself wrote
that ‘The selection of grants [to be evaluated] was purposeful and not meant to yield a statistical sample.’ Yet, they
used those very grants as the basis for the counties they studied statistically.”
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BTOP-funded projects, provided that an unbiased method for choosing projects to evaluate is
used. Another extension would be to return to the evaluation once additional years of broadband
adoption data are available, both to account for the few projects that had not been completed in
2013 and to check for longer term effects of the BTOP spending. Unless such future exploration
of additional data yields strikingly different results, however, the case for the efficacy of BTOP
for stimulating broadband adoption must remain weak.
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Appendix
Here we describe how we adapt existing methods for ordered logit estimation, with and without
fixed effects, for our interval censored logistic regression problem.
A.

Interval censored logistic regression

Examine first the case in which the latent data 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ are generated from equation (1), where

εit is distributed logistic with scale parameter σ, and the observation rule for categories j = 0,…,5
is
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗 if ( 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 < 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1 ) ⇔ ( 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 < 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1 )

(4)

(refer to Figure 3). In the notation, γ from equation (1) is subsumed into β and the intercept α is
written explicitly in equation (4). It is understood that 𝜏𝜏0 = −∞ and 𝜏𝜏6 = ∞. The likelihood of
observing 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗 is then

𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗) = Λ �
� − Λ�
�
𝜎𝜎
𝜎𝜎

(5)

The cutpoints τ are known (0, 20, 40, 60, and 80). In the usual ordered logit case with unknown
cutpoints, only 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎 and 𝜅𝜅𝑗𝑗 = �𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 − 𝛼𝛼�/𝜎𝜎, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5, are identified (as can be seen from
examination of equation (5)). Given that the τ are equidistant, so are the κ. We thus first

perform ordered logit estimation (using Stata 13.1) with the three linear constraints 𝜅𝜅2 − 𝜅𝜅1 =

𝜅𝜅3 − 𝜅𝜅2 = 𝜅𝜅4 − 𝜅𝜅3 = 𝜅𝜅5 − 𝜅𝜅4 to find estimates �𝛿𝛿̂ , 𝜅𝜅̂ �. Then the parameters of interest are
recovered from the following rightmost equations: 29
𝜅𝜅2 − 𝜅𝜅1 =
𝜅𝜅1 =
29

𝜏𝜏2 − 𝜏𝜏1 20
20
=
⇒ 𝜎𝜎� =
𝜎𝜎
𝜎𝜎
𝜅𝜅̂ 2 − 𝜅𝜅̂1

𝜏𝜏1 − 𝛼𝛼 −𝛼𝛼
=
⇒ 𝛼𝛼� = −𝜎𝜎�𝜅𝜅̂ 1
𝜎𝜎
𝜎𝜎

The nlcom command in Stata 13.1 returns the estimates �𝛼𝛼�, 𝛽𝛽̂ , 𝜎𝜎�� and the associated asymptotic variance matrix.
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B.

𝛽𝛽̂ = 𝜎𝜎�𝛿𝛿̂

Interval censored fixed effects logistic regression

Baetschmann’s (2012) extension to Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann’s (2011) “blow up
and cluster” (BUC) method for fixed effects ordered logit allows estimation when α in equation
(4) is replaced with a unit-specific fixed effect αi. The method estimates 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎 and 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 =
�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗+1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 �/𝜎𝜎, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,4. As above, constraints are imposed in our estimation to enforce

equidistant cutpoints: 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗+1 = 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,3. From the estimates of �𝛿𝛿̂ , 𝜆𝜆̂�, the parameters of
interest are recovered from 𝜎𝜎� = 20/𝜆𝜆̂1 and 𝛽𝛽̂ = 𝜎𝜎�𝛿𝛿̂.
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Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: The distribution of total BTOP spending per household at the county level
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Note: Unit of observation is the county. Data include all funded projects and are constructed as
described in the text. Epanechnikov kernal, bw = 0.3.
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Figure 2: The distribution of Sustainable Adoption BTOP spending per household at the county
level
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Balled spikes represent discrete probability mass, estimated as fraction of sample. The rest
of the plotted distribution is a kernel density estimate. See also notes to previous figure.
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Figure 3: Latent continuous RFC/HH and the observed categorical dependent variable
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Figure 4: Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline
regression
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Figure 5: Marginal effects of Sustainable Adoption BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted
cubic spline regression

-2

-1

0
1
2
log total BTOP $$ per HH in the county

-2

3

Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence band

-1

0
1
2
log total BTOP $$ per HH in the county

3

Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence band

Panel A: FCC definition of broadband

Panel B: BTOP definition of broadband

Marginal effect on rfcBTOP (on 100 point scale)
-10
-5
0
5
10

Marginal effect on rfcFCC (on 100 point scale)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15

Figure 6: Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline
regression with trend
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Figure 7: Marginal effects of Sustainable Adoption BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted
cubic spline regression with trend
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Figure 8: Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline
regression, alternative sample
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Figure 9: Marginal effects of total BTOP spending on RFC/HH from restricted cubic spline
regression with trend, alternative sample

-2

0
2
4
log total BTOP $$ per HH in the county

Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence band

Panel A: FCC definition of broadband

6

-2

0
2
4
log total BTOP $$ per HH in the county

6

Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence band

Panel B: BTOP definition of broadband

37

Table 1: Applicants by type.

Applicant
Type

Number of
Applications

City
County
State
Library
University
Tribal
Others
Total

257
128
132
82
176
27
896
1,698

Percent of
Percent of
Number of
Total
Total
Applications
Applications
Applications
Funded
Funded
15.14
20
6.92
7.54
20
6.92
7.77
65
22.49
4.83
8
2.77
10.37
30
10.38
1.59
6
2.08
52.77
140
48.44
100
289
100

Table 2: Applicants by scope of recipients served.

Application to serve:
Multi-county
Single-county
Total

Number of
Applications

Percentage of
Applications

779
919
1,698

45.88
54.12
100

Percent of
Number of
Total
Applications
Applications
Funded
Funded
209
72.31
80
27.68
289
100
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Table 3: Target groups by frequency of citations.
BTOP Target Group
Workforce
Development
Mapping
Digital Literacy
Youth
Rural
Public Safety
Medical
Partner with College
Native American
Minorities
Small Businesses
Public Housing
Senior Citizens
Disabled
ESL
Hispanic
African American
Asian
Legal Services
Agriculture
Veterans Military
Homeless
Total

Number of
Times Cited
963
916
887
347
299
288
245
201
198
130
119
91
85
59
54
40
21
20
14
14
14
12
5,017

Percentage
of Total
Citations
19.19
18.26
17.68
6.92
5.96
5.74
4.88
4.01
3.95
2.59
2.37
1.81
1.69
1.18
1.08
0.80
0.42
0.40
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.24
100
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Table 4: Applications funded by category.
Program
Category
Infrastructure
Public Computer
Centers
Sustainable
Adoption
State Data and
Development
Total

Percentage
of
Applications
Funded

Proscribed
Funds
($M)

Amount
Disbursed
($M)

Percent of
Funds
Disbursed

Number of
Applications

Percentage of
Applications

Number of
Applications
Funded

397

23.38

123

42.56

3,729

3,484.4

93.44

638

37.57

65

22.49

200

200.5

100.25

584

34.39

45

15.57

250

251.2

100.48

79

4.65

56

19.38

350

292.8

83.66

1698

100

289

100

4,529

4,228.9

93.37
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Table 5: Applicant populations by socio-demographic characteristics.
All Counties
Applied

Black
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian
Disabled
Veteran
Seniors

Counties Covered by an Application
Did Not Apply

Funded,

Denied,

1 obs./County

1 obs./Application

1 obs./County

1 obs./County

1 obs./County

p
[pw]

p
[pw]

p
[pw]

p
[pw]

p
[pw]

0.102
[0.136]
0.077
[0.168]
0.012
[0.051]
0.020
[0.009]
0.156
[0.119]
0.112
[0.094]
0.157
[0.133]

0.123
[0.160]
0.089
[0.271]
0.017
[0.076]
0.018
[0.008]
0.155
[0.108]
0.107
[0.074]
0.154
[0.125]

0.044
[0.072]
0.076
[0.072]
0.010
[0.019]
0.018
[0.008]
0.144
[0.130]
0.115
[0.111]
0.159
[0.141]

0.106
[0.140]
0.076
[0.173]
0.012
[0.054]
0.018
[0.009]
0.157
[0.119]
0.111
[0.092]
0.156
[0.132]

0.083
[0.109]
0.078
[0.129]
0.010
[0.032]
0.028
[0.011]
0.153
[0.123]
0.114
[0.112]
0.162
[0.140]

Statistics are p, the simple average across counties of the proportion of the population in the group given in the header column, and
[pw], the population-weighted average. In columns headed “1 obs./County,” the statistics are based on the county as the unit of
observation, so each county appears once in the calculations. In columns headed “1 obs./Application,” the statistics are based on the
application as the unit of observation, so each county appears once per BTOP grant application in the calculations.

41

Table 6: Categories for the dependent variable, residential fixed broadband connections per hundred households (RFC/HH)
Category Indicator, y
0
1
2
3
4
5

Range of the Latent
Variable, y*
0
(0,20]
(20,40]
(40,60]
(60,80]
(80,∞)
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Table 7: Summary statistics of the data used in the regressions
Mean
Outcomes, 2009
Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH)
category, FCC definition (midyear)
Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH)
category, BTOP definition (midyear)
Outcomes, 2013
Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH)
category, FCC definition (end of year)
Residential fixed BB (RFC/HH)
category, BTOP def’n (beginning of yr)
Total BTOP Award Amount/HH, log
Sustainable Adoption BTOP Award
Amount/HH, log
Control Variables
Population, log
Population change, 2000-09
Projected population change, 2009-14
Age less than 20
Age 65+
Disabled
Veterans
Black
Native American
Asian
Multiracial
Hispanic
HH Income in $(25,50)K
HH Income in $ (50,75)K
HH Income in $ (75,100)K
HH Income in $ (100,150)K
HH Income > $150K
High School degree
College: Some or 2yr
College: 4 year+
Establishment count per capita, log
CBSA: metropolitan
CBSA: micropolitan
Midwest region
South region
West region

S.D.

Min

Max

2.859

0.842

1.000

5.000

2.439

0.913

0.000

5.000

3.555

0.787

1.000

5.000

3.211

0.836

1.000

5.000

2.878

1.554

-.345

8.526

-0.761

1.403

-2.036

5.482

10.260
4.168
2.191
0.254
0.157
13.264
11.239
0.090
0.019
0.012
0.012
0.077
0.318
0.177
0.073
0.042
0.021
0.346
0.262
0.166
-3.815
0.347
0.220
0.336
0.454
0.141

1.464
14.159
7.133
0.034
0.039
4.813
2.835
0.145
0.076
0.027
0.012
0.130
0.037
0.040
0.032
0.029
0.019
0.067
0.057
0.080
0.371
0.476
0.414
0.473
0.498
0.348

4.078
-96.308
-100.000
0.132
0.028
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.148
0.057
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.107
0.088
0.045
-5.740
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

16.111
120.838
28.169
0.454
0.361
34.400
27.788
0.859
0.920
0.528
0.258
0.975
0.471
0.311
0.237
0.252
0.185
0.532
0.450
0.642
-1.376
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Note: All data for covariates are for 2009 unless otherwise mentioned. The statistics for the BTOP spending do not
include 2009 values, when all are zero.
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Table 8: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Linear Impact of BTOP Awards
Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying definition
FCC
Total BTOP Award
Amount/HH, log
Sustainable Adoption
BTOP Award
Amount/HH, log
Constant

2.600

2.921

(0.093)***

(0.098)***

48.533
(8.344)***

Population, log
Population change,
2000-09
Projected population
change, 2009-14
Age less than 20
Age 65+

Veterans
Black
Native American
Asian
Multiracial
Hispanic
HH Income ∈ (25,50)K
HH Income ∈ (50,75)K

HH Income ∈ (75,100)K

50.351
(9.501)***

FCC

BTOP

3.732

3.920

(0.136)***

(0.149)***

61.423
(8.364)***

66.189
(9.645)***

1.028

1.518

0.999

1.472

(0.235)***

(0.256)***

(0.234)***

(0.258)***

-0.028

0.001

-0.022

0.005

(0.029)

(0.031)

(0.029)

(0.031)

0.020

0.054

0.015

0.054

(0.046)

(0.049)

(0.047)

(0.051)

3.644

-9.417

1.386

-13.212

(10.572)

(11.908)

(10.450)

(11.835)

25.016

19.384

13.931

4.418

(11.333)*

(9.950)

(11.546)

-0.334

-0.369

-0.326

-0.354

(0.069)***

(0.075)***

(0.068)***

(0.074)***

0.171

0.098

0.241

0.174

(0.107)

(0.115)

(0.104)**

(0.114)

-8.518

-7.001

(2.033)***

(2.168)***

(1.938)***

-1.752

-9.141

-6.617

(3.487)

(4.746)*

(3.791)*

(9.969)**

Disabled

BTOP

-10.981

-9.789
(2.061)***

-13.469
(5.315)**

31.259

29.928

10.905

9.150

(11.663)***

(16.112)*

(12.070)

(15.232)

-70.428

-70.035

-63.654

-62.807

(22.012)***

(25.451)***

(22.658)***

(27.300)**

-0.572

-2.550

-2.551

-4.773

(2.109)

(2.201)

(2.105)

(2.160)**

3.942

-9.017

3.340

-11.416

(9.162)

(10.351)

(9.157)

(10.382)

4.771

14.118

-3.790

2.952

(10.188)

(11.230)

(10.225)

(11.345)

41.091
(20.054)**

5.882

30.690

-5.457

(22.583)

(19.921)

(22.938)

Table continued next
page
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Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying definition
FCC
HH Income ∈
(100,150)K
HH Income > 150K
High School degree

College: 4 year+
Establishment count per
capita, log
CBSA: metropolitan
CBSA: micropolitan
Midwest region

9.963

18.614

23.553

(27.162)

(24.951)

(27.837)

67.366

70.114

55.171

54.312

(24.589)***

(26.147)***

(25.163)**

(26.827)**

3.149
32.610

(7.132)*

37.276

6.373

-7.628

(6.663)

(6.938)

28.500

33.707

(7.057)***

3.631

-3.123

10.013

3.344

(6.222)

(7.053)

(6.137)

(7.056)

(6.569)***

(6.869)***

4.209

3.922

4.036

3.984

(0.827)***

(1.005)***

(0.833)***

(1.020)***

1.055

1.735

0.736

1.322

(0.652)

(0.687)**

(0.658)

(0.698)*

0.581

0.953

0.248

0.529

(0.536)

(0.591)

(0.524)

(0.590)

-10.350

-10.607

-11.377

-11.762

-10.762
-10.345
(1.049)***

σ (logistic scale
parameter)
χ2 statistic
χ2 degrees of freedom
χ2 p-value
log likelihood
N (observations)
N (clusters = counties)

-12.886

(6.869)***

(0.916)***

West region

BTOP

8.839

(0.838)***

South region

FCC

(24.928)

(6.826)

College: Some or 2yr

BTOP

(0.818)***

-10.840
(0.891)***

-12.378
(1.103)***

(0.832)***

-12.079
(0.915)***

-9.957
(1.052)***

(0.840)***

-12.268
(0.914)***

-11.884
(1.115)***

7.902

8.558

8.040

8.806

(0.096)***

(0.097)***

(0.097)***

(0.099)***

1,958.6
27
0.000
-7,042.4
6,272
3,136

2,075.5
27
0.000
-7,562.8
6,272
3,136

1,976.6
27
0.000
-7,128.1
6,272
3,136

1,957.4
27
0.000
-7,712.1
6,272
3,136

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Notes: Regression specification is based on equation (1) in the text. No fixed effects are
included in these regressions. Estimates are scaled so that coefficients are the marginal effects
on the dependent variable (given in the column headings), where the latter is on a 100-point
scale. Estimation method is as described in section A of the appendix. Figures in parentheses
are estimated standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and account for clustering
on counties. χ2 statistic is for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
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Table 9: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Linear Impact of BTOP Awards (Fixed Effects)
Y = 100 × Residential Fixed Broadband Connections/Household, varying definition
FCC
Total BTOP Award
Amount/HH, log
Sustainable Adoption BTOP
Award Amount/HH, log
Non-Sustainable Adoption
BTOP Award Amount/HH, log
Year 2013
σ (logistic scale parameter)
Marginal cost per RFC from
Sustainable Adoption $$
χ2 statistic
χ2 degrees of freedom
χ2 p-value
log likelihood
N (original observations)
N (blown up observations)
N (clusters = counties)

BTOP

2.995

3.356

(0.103)***

(0.104)***

FCC

BTOP

FCC

BTOP

FCC

BTOP

4.903

5.224

2.155

1.801

0.313

0.024

(0.182)***

(0.188)***

(0.268)***

(0.271)***

(0.289)

(0.297)

13.272

15.226

2.000

2.508

(0.152)***

(0.155)***
(0.713)***

(0.745)***

8.167

8.479

8.377

8.868

8.086

8.429

7.839

8.203

(0.142)***

(0.135)***

(0.138)***

(0.140)***

(0.137)***

(0.134)***

(0.135)***

(0.140)***

$42.53

$39.91

$96.76

$115.75

$667.03

$8,610.85

634.7
1
0.000
-4,249.3
6,234
49,816
3,117

645.2
1
0.000
-5,078.5
6,268
77,280
3,134

747.3
2
0.000
-3,959.0
6,234
49,816
3,117

842.1
2
0.000
-4,600.9
6,268
77,280
3,134

825.8
2
0.000
-3,718.8
6,234
49,816
3,117

845.0
2
0.000
-4,332.7
6,268
77,280
3,134

668.6
1
0.000
-4,030.7
6,234
49,816
3,117

798.9
1
0.000
-4,652.4
6,268
77,280
3,134

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Notes: Regression specification is based on equation (2) in the text. Marginal cost per residential fixed connection (RFC) is
calculated from the coefficients for Sustainable Adoption spending, and is a household-weighted average across counties. County
fixed effects are included in these regressions. Estimation method is as described in section B of the appendix. See notes to previous
table regarding scaling of coefficients and s.e.’s.
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Table 10: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Flexible Impact of Total BTOP Awards
Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying
definition
FCC
Xtotal = Total BTOP
Award Amount/HH, log
Xtotal, Spline variable 2

Xtotal, Spline variable 4

Xtotal, Spline variable 6

8.552

9.068

4.919

(0.569)***

(3.336)***

(3.544)

-127.812

-144.498
(29.540)***

-138.566
(52.785)***

-97.925
(54.663)*

404.143

468.051

433.017

343.019

(110.146)***

(111.747)***

(162.483)***

(166.680)**

-444.089

-504.365
(147.304)***

-468.504
(176.817)***

-398.632
(180.438)**

365.986

271.211

379.366

213.136

(211.446)*

(219.331)

(218.570)*

(226.071)

-232.064

28.889

-242.552

74.638

(282.869)

(293.484)

(286.037)

(296.388)

Year 2013

-1.499
(5.741)

σ (logistic scale
parameter)
χ2 statistic
χ2 degrees of freedom
χ2 p-value
log likelihood
N (original observations)
N (blown up
observations)
N (clusters = counties)

BTOP

8.230

(144.488)***

Xtotal, Spline variable 5

FCC

(0.542)***
(29.062)***

Xtotal, Spline variable 3

BTOP

7.786
(0.135)***

8.159

7.786

6.496
(6.124)

8.156

(0.142)***

(0.135)***

(0.141)***

887.6
6
0.000
-3,670.8
6,234
49,816

896.1
6
0.000
-4,278.5
6,268
77,280

888.3
7
0.000
-3,670.7
6,234
49,816

904.6
7
0.000
-4,276.7
6,268
77,280

3,117

3,134

3,117

3,134

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Notes: Regression specification is based on equation (3) in the text, where f is estimated with
restricted cubic splines. County fixed effects are included in these regressions. Seven spline
knots were used. Estimation method is as described in section B of the appendix. See also notes
to Table 8.
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Table 11: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Flexible Impact of Sustainable Adoption
BTOP Awards
Y = 100 × Residential Fixed BB Connections/HH, varying
definition

XSA = Sustainable
Adoption BTOP Award
Amount/HH, log
XSA, Spline variable 2

FCC

BTOP

FCC

BTOP

13.939

15.843

-0.905

-1.521

(1.794)

(1.834)

(0.704)***

-233.862
(25.202)***

XSA, Spline variable 3

1,404.713
(171.774)***

XSA, Spline variable 4

-1,276.846
(164.122)***

Year 2013

(0.737)***

-281.421
(26.260)***

1,713.498
(178.447)***

-1,566.675
(170.289)***

37.999

36.824

(39.029)

(39.611)

-265.225

-240.313

(250.170)

(253.244)

255.865

226.036

(233.783)

(236.430)

14.039
(1.541)***

16.359
(1.592)***

σ (logistic scale
7.979
8.386
7.834
8.200
(0.138)***
(0.142)***
(0.135)***
(0.140)***
parameter)
χ2 statistic
754.6
782.2
838.5
851.9
2
χ degrees of freedom
4
4
5
5
χ2 p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
log likelihood
-3,851.3
-4,524.3
-3,716.0
-4,331.0
N (observations)
6,234
6,268
6,234
6,268
N (observations)
49,816
77,280
49,816
77,280
N (clusters = counties)
3,117
3,134
3,117
3,134
Notes: Regression specification is based on equation (3) in the text, where f is estimated with
restricted cubic splines. County fixed effects are included in these regressions. Five spline knots
were used. Estimation method is as described in section B of the appendix. See also notes to
Table 8.

48

Table 12: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Linear Impact of BTOP Awards (Fixed Effects) – Alternative Spending Categories
Y = 100 × Residential Fixed Broadband Connections/Household, varying definition
Sustainable Adoption BTOP
Award Amount/HH, log
Infrastructure BTOP Award
Amount/HH, log

FCC

BTOP

FCC

BTOP

3.420

3.278

1.069

0.859

(0.237)***

(0.241)***

(0.273)***

(0.280)***

1.363

1.805

-0.175

0.229

(0.144)***

(0.148)***

(0.179)

(0.190)

2.334

2.416

(0.162)***

(0.173)***

Other BTOP Award
Amount/HH, log
σ (logistic scale parameter)
χ statistic
χ2 degrees of freedom
χ2 p-value
log likelihood
N (original observations)
N (blown up observations)
N (clusters = counties)
2

8.234

8.618

7.914

8.314

(0.138)***

(0.136)***

(0.135)***

(0.139)***

698.9
2
0.000
-4,102.2
6,234
49,816
3,117

782.0
2
0.000
-4,809.1
6,268
77,280
3,134

805.9
3
0.000
-3,805.1
6,234
49,816
3,117

869.5
3
0.000
-4,460.7
6,268
77,280
3,134

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Notes: Regression specification is based on equation (2) in the text. County fixed effects are included in these regressions.
Estimation method is as described in section B of the appendix. See notes to Table 8 regarding scaling of coefficients and s.e.’s.
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Table 13: Interval Censored Logistic Regressions, Difference in Differences Specifications
Y = 100 × Residential Fixed Broadband Connections/Household, varying definition

Difference-in-differences
coefficient (T×Year2013)
Year 2013
σ (logistic scale parameter)
χ2 statistic
χ2 degrees of freedom
χ2 p-value
log likelihood
N (original observations)
N (blown up observations)
N (clusters = counties)

Treatment Variable T1

Treatment Variable T2

Treatment Variable T3

FCC

BTOP

FCC

BTOP

FCC

BTOP

0.915

-0.017

0.888

-0.034

1.153

0.264

(0.836)

(0.868)

(0.841)

(0.873)

(0.975)

(0.999)

13.385

15.282

13.377

15.278

13.376

15.280

(0.618)***

(0.649)***

(0.618)***

(0.649)***

(0.617)***

(0.649)***

7.838

8.203

7.796

8.170

7.787

8.187

(0.135)***

(0.140)***

(0.134)***

(0.141)***

(0.151)***

(0.159)***

819.3
2
0.000
-3,718.7
6,234
49,816
3,117

840.4
2
0.000
-4,332.7
6,268
77,280
3,134

821.7
2
0.000
-3,602.6
6,078
48,644
3,039

831.9
2
0.000
-4,203.9
6,108
75,450
3,054

622.6
2
0.000
-2,753.3
4,664
37,284
2,332

653.1
2
0.000
-3,243.4
4,684
57,818
2,342

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Notes: Regression specification is difference in differences, with treatment group indicated in the column heading (which are
described in the text). County fixed effects are included in these regressions. Estimation method is as described in section B of the
appendix. See notes to Table 8 regarding scaling of coefficients and s.e.’s.
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